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INTRODUCTION
Land management policies, especially by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM), have historically been effected by land 
classifications and withdrawals. Most of the land classi­
fications are at least 20 years old and the withdrawals are 
often as old as fifty years. Congress recognized that many of 
these land orders and actions were no longer needed and 
directed their review and rescission in 1976 when it passed the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1701-1784.
The momentum for reform was generated by the Public Land 
Law Review Commission's criticisms in One Third of the Nation's 
Land, A Report to the President and Congress by the Public Land 
Law Review Commission (1971) (hereafter One Third of the 
Nation's Land). The Commission recommended review and
revocation of the extensive withdrawals because they closed to
mineral entry and development more than half of the federal
land. Id. at 53. The Commission concluded that 
revocation of these withdrawals, the efficacy of other 
land law reforms would be negated. The Commission was 
critical of land classifications because they were made 





Congress responded by directing withdr 
revocation and authorizing the terminati
classifications. The review and revocation o
*
addressed in § 204 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 
classification termination is left to the d 
Secretary in § 202, so long as termination is : 
the land use plan. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(d).
awal review and 
on of land 
f withdrawals is 
§ 1714. Land 
iscretion of the 
consistent with
The Department of Interior implemented these directives 
first separately by only reviewing and revoking withdrawals. 
In May, 1981, Secretary established withdrawal review and also 
made reovcation as a priority and land classification termi­
nation a priority. From 1977 to 1980, the Interior Department 
completed very few withdrawal revocations. The BLM corres­
pondence shows that there was substantial confusion regarding 
the criteria for and the extent of documentation required, 
either under the National Environmental Policy Act or public 
participation objectives in FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1739(e). Each 
withdrawal revocation required an environmental assessment,
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description of the land, and formal order revoking the 
withdrawal. The order was published in the Federal Register 
and, in many cases, public notice of the proposed action was 
also given. In 1981, the BLM made withdrawal revocations 
subject to a categorical exclusion, meaning that an 
environmental assessment was generally not necessary. While 
EAs were occasionally done and the files contain a written 
record of decision, the use of categorical exclusions 
contributed significantly to the increased number of withdrawal 
revocations.
Between January, 1981 and July, 1985, when the National 
Wildlife Federation filed suit, more than 22 million acres of 
public land withdrawals had been revoked and 160 million acres 
of land classification terminations. The National Wildife 
Federation challenged all of the previous withdrawal 
revocations and land classification terminations as violating 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The 
Federation seeks reinstatement of all classifications and 
withdrawals, promulgation of regulations under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the preparation of a programmatic 
environmental impact statement (EIS), and the delay of land 
status changes until preparation of the resource management 
plans under FLPMA. While most of the Federation's claims are
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procedural, the plaintiff also argues that all of the land 
status changes required Congressional review.
In light of the extent of the land status changes already 
completed, this case also raises important public policy 
questions. First, whether procedural obligations can justify 
undoing 1,091 separate and independent agency actions spanning 
four and a half years. Second, whether the subsequent creation 
of third party rights in reliance on the apparent regularity of 
agency action mitigates any retrospective relief— especially 
when those rights may also be set aside.
A preliminary injunction prohibiting any action 
inconsistent with the previous withdrawal or classification 
issued February 10, 1986. The federal government and 
Defendant-Intervenors, Mountain States Legal Foundation 
appealed the injunction. The Court of Appeals heard argument 
April 27, 1987. The case in the district court has been fully 
briefed on motions for summary judgment and is awaiting a 
decision from the district court.
The following discussion will review the history of 
public land withdrawals, and land classifications, the reforms 
introduced in FLPMA, and the implications of any decision in 
National Wildlife Federation v. Burford.
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A. Before passage of the Pickett Act of 1910, 
withdrawals were made pursuant to specific statutes, 
which made land available for disposal and permitted 
exceptions.
I C. Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals and Reservations 
of Public Domain Lands, Public Land Law Review 
Commission 55-62 (1969)(hereafter Wheatley).
1. Forest Reservations were made by the President 
to preclude disposal under the various public 
land laws, including the Homestead Act of 1862, 
Timber & Culture Act, etc. These forest 
reserves were also intended to protect the 
government's revenue interests in timber being 
harvested from federal land. Forest reserves 
were created to maintain favorable conditions 
of flow and to provide a continuous supply of 
timber for the nation.
a. Creative Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1101-1103 c.
561 § 24.
I. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND WITHDRAWALS.
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b. Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 § 30
Stat. 34, c. 2, § 1.
2. Public purpose or use - many general statutes 
were enacted to permit President to "set aside 
[land] for public uses" near towns and cities 
in specific territories or states. e .g . Act 
of March 1, 1847 ch.32, § 2, 9 Stat. 146.
3. Military purposes - general grants for military 
to build forts and harbors.
4. Indian trading posts and reservations Act of
April 18, 1796, ch. 13, § 1. (trading posts).
Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, § 1, 4 Stat. 411, 
412 (1830).
5. Salt Springs minerals, Act of March 26, 1804 
ch. 35, § 6
6. Townsites
7. Lighthouses
8. Railroad grants - authority to withdraw the 
designated right of way.
-6-
B. Implied Authority of 
public land.
the President to withdraw
1. Withdrawal Power of the President implied from 
specific statutes. Wood v. Beach, 156 U.S. 548 
(1895)(authority to reserve lands from sale 
that were identified for grant.) See also 
Railroad Grant cases. Southern Pac. R.R. Co. 
v. Belly 183 U.S. 675, 679 (1902).
a. Also upheld such withdrawal revocations. 
Oregon & C.R.R. v. Bales, 28 L.D. 231 
(1899) (indemnity Hands);
b. rejected by federal court in Southern Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Groeck, 87 F. 970 (9th Cir. 
1898). I Wheatley, at 62-69.
2. Supervisory powers as a second source of 
implied withdrawal authority. Abandoned 
Military Reservation Forest Reserve, 35 L.D. 
277 (1906).
C. The Supreme Court upheld the President's frequently 
exercised authority to withdraw land as an exercise 
of implied power to which Congress acquiesced.
7-
1 . United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459
(1915).
2. Courts had previously upheld practice. Grisar
v. McDowell, 11 U.S. (6 Wall) 363 (1891).
D. Congress passed the Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 157 (repealed in 1976) to limit the President’s 
power to close land to mineral entry and development.
1. Withdrawals were to be temporary or in aid of 
legislation and could not foreclose mineral 
entry.
a. "Temporary" in fact stretched to decades 
and, as a result, substantial segments of 
federal land were closed to some form of 
disposal.
2. Land that was permanently 
administrative site could be 
entry.
3. Two different interpretations 
Act evolved. Initially the
withdrawn for 
closed to mineral
of the Pickett 
language was read
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literally and temporary withdrawals did not 
close the land to location under the 1872 
Mining Laws. However, in 1944, the Attorney 
General concluded that the Pickett Act merely 
supplemented the President's implied withdrawal 
powers affirmed in United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co. Using this latter interpretation of the 
President's authority the Secretary could 
preclude mineral entry.
I Wheatley, at 106-121; III Wheatley App. B.
V4. This interpretation manifested itself in an 
increase in lands closed to mineral entry.
E. Extent of withdrawal problem was first recognized in 
the 1950's when the BLM initiated withdrawal review 
and revocation. This program continued with 
different levels of success and productivity until 
the 1960s. II Wheatley at 420-435.
F. Scope of issue is also illustrated by the various
statutes and purposes for which BLM and, Forest
Service land to a lesser extent, has been withdrawn 
during the twentieth century.
-9-
2 .
1, For other federal agencies:
Department of Defense;
Federal Power Commission , now the Federal
Regulatory Commission, under § 24 of the
Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S:.c. § 818.
c. Bureau of Reclamation under the Reclamation 
Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 391.
d. Forest Service administrative and
recreation sites;
e. Department of Justice border patrol 
training facility.
For the Interior Department:
a. Stock driveways;




HISTORY OF LAND CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Before 1934, the General Land Office administered 
the disposal of public domain under the Homestead 
Act, the Desert Land Entry Act, Carey Act, and 
various state land selection statutes. Local and 
Regional Land Use Planning, Herman D. North and 
Associates Berkeley, California, Vol. II, IV-14, 
(revised 1970)(hereafter North).
B. Taylor Grazing Act of 
authorized the Secretary to 
was suitable for disposal.
1934, 43 U.S.C. §
determine whether 
North at IV - 14.
315,
land
1. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes withdrew 80 
million acres for grazing, as not suitable for 
disposal.
2. While an entryman could petition the Secretary
to classify the land for disposal, the
Secretary's decision not to reclassify was 
invariably upheld. Id_. at IV-15.
C. By Executive Order in 1961, President Kennedy
directed a review of public land resource
-11-
management. The results of that review and 
Congressional response led to the creation of the 
Public Land Law Review Commission and passage of the 
Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1114-1115 (expired in 1971). North at 
IV-16.
D. Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1114-1115 (CMUA) (expired in 1971)
directed the classification of all public domain as 
to retention (multiple use management) or disposal. 
The Act established 10 multiple uses including 
livestock grazing, timber, mineral development, 
recreation, watershed, fish and wildlife, industrial 
development, wilderness, occupancy, and the 
protection of other public values.
1. Criteria for retention reflected the ten
multiple uses, plus administration needs. 
North at IV - 17, 20.
a . All BLM lands occurring in blocks were 
classified for retention;
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b. Land was closed to mineral entry to protect 
scenic or other public values; otherwise only 
closed to disposal statutes.
2. Criteria for disposal:
a . required for the orderly growth of
communities, or
b . land was determined to be chiefly valuable
for residential, commercial, agricultural,
industrial uses.
\
c. The BLM added by regulation that there was
adequate local land use planning and
zoning. This final criteria never was
defined.
d. Applied to urban inholdings but often no
transfer because of the local zoning 
criteria.
e. Applicant could petition for disposal
class i f icat ion but Secretary had virtually
unreviewable discretion to deny. North at IV-18.
-13-
E. PLLRC criticism as articulated in North report and 
One Third of the Nations Land:
1. Inadequate information used to make
classification decisions and
failed to apply planning criteria. North at 
1-21-23 t IV-38.
The Commission noted: "To date it has been used 
primarily in a defensive manner to segregate 
large blocks of land from the operation of 
specified public land lawsr usually without 
adequate information and planning. . . ." One
Third of the Nation's Land, at 54.
2. Public participation generally existed.
3. Inadequate coordination of. land use and 
development programs with local or regional 
government. North at IV 91.
a. Difficult to get necessary inventory data 
from local government. North at 93.
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4. Little forecasting and no mechanism to analyze 
tradeoffs and costs. North at IV-95.
III. CONGRESS RESPONDED TO THE ABOVE PROBLEMS IN THE
FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT (FLPMA) IN 
1976.
A. Withdrawal Review and Revocation.
1. Section 204(a) states: "[T]he Secretary is
authorized to make, modify, extend, or revoke 
withdrawals but only in accordance with the
provisions and limitations of this section." 
43 U.S.C. § 1714(a).
2. Restrictions on New Withdrawals.
a. Repealed the implied withdrawal authority
recognized in United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459 ( 1914) .
H. Rep. No. 94-1163. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 
reprinted in Legislative History of Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(hereafter Legislative History) at 459, 924.
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b. New withdrawals require publication of notice 
of segregation, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b); Congres­
sional veto and time limit of 20 years for 
withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1714(c); and a public hearing, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1714(h).
3. Role of Congress in Review of Withdrawal 
Revocations: Congressional review for withdrawal
revocations was added in § 204(1), which states:
The Secretary shall, within fifteen years of the 
date of enactment of this Act, review withdrawals 
existing on the date of approval of this Act,.
. .of (1) all Federal lands other than withdraw­
als of the public lands administered by the Bureau 
of Land Management and of lands which, on date of 
approval of this Act, were part of Indian 
reservations and other Indian holdings, the Na­
tional Forest System, the National Park System, 
the National Wildlife Refuge System, other lands 
administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service or 
the Secretary through the Fish and Wildlife Serv­
ice, the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, 
and the National System of Trails; and (2) all 
public lands administered by the Bureau of Land 
Management and of lands in the National Forest 
System (except those in wilderness areas,) and 
those areas formally identified as primitive or
natural areas or designated as 
recreation areas) which closed the 
appropriation under the Mining Law of 
Stat. 91, as amended; 30 U.S.C. § 22, et 
to leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act 









43 U.S.C. § 1714(1)
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a. Legislative history. § 204(1) first appeared
as § 404 in early drafts bills that preceded 
FLPMA in the 92d and 93rd Congresses. § 404 
reappeared in the 94th Congress. The explanation 
in H.R. Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 
15, 1976), states that:
Recent studies have shown not only the increase 
of administrative restrictions on multiple use 
but also failure to examine past actions to de­
termine their continuing value. The withdrawal 
provisions of section 204 and the land use pro­
visions of section 202 of this bill, together 
with this section [404], are designed to en­
courage correction of this situation.
Legislative History at 449.
b. § 404 was moved to Title II of FLPMA by the 
Conference Committee, becoming § 204(1).
Legislative History at 883-885.
c. § 204(1) is susceptible of at least two different 
interpretations:
that § 204(a) 
classes of 
Congressional
and § 204(1) created two different 
withdrawal revocations and that 
oversight is not required for
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withdrawal revocations made under § 204 (A) in
the ordinary course of business.
Memorandum of Associate Solicitor John R. 
(October 30, 1980) at 5.
Alternatively, that § 204(1) modifies § 
and that all withdrawal revocations 
federal land to mineral uses must 
congressional oversight.
B. Congress also directed classification 
§ 202(d) provides:
Any classification of public lands or 
any land use plan in effect on the date 
of enactment of this Act is subject to 
review in the land use planning process 
conducted under this section, and all 
public lands, regardless of classifica­
tion, are subject to inclusion in any 
land use plan developed pursuant to 
this section. The Secretary may modify 
or terminate any such classification 
consistent with such land use plans.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(d).
1. The legislative origin of classification 








a. Classification review first appeared in S. 
424, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. as section 101(c),
which is very similar to § 202(d) of FLPMA, 
43 U.S.C. § 1712(d). The only difference is 
the addition of permissive language that the 
Secretary "may" modify or terminate a 
classification, which was added in 1976.
b. The explanation states that classifications 
are to be reviewed in the planning process 
and that "[t]his provision is to insure that 
existing classifications are not frozen and 
that indepth planning may be conducted on any 
lands already classified." S. Rep. 93-873, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 1974)






rst directed in the CMUA, land use plans were
itten for BLM land between 1964-1 972, and were
lied Management Framework Plans (MFP). They
re functional, addressing grazing , timber , and
ldlife habitat.
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1. MFPs were criticized for failure to integrate 
planning functions into one document; failure 
to coordinate plans with land use activities 
of state and local government, and lack of 
interdisciplinary analysis. North at 91.
2. Despite criticisms, PLLRC generally concluded 
that the BLM plans were a good first effort. 
One Third of the Nations Land at 46.
Congress adopted this conclusion and did not
adopt the PLLRC' s recommendation for dominant
use. Legislative History at 103.
The Senate Committee Report stated:
[t]hese policies (multiple use and sustained 
yield) are not radically new. For some 
time, the Department of Interior has 
administered the national resource lands in 
a manner which is substantially in accord 
with these policies; and they were among the 
major policy recommendations of the Public 
Land Law Review Commission.
Legislative History at 104.
Congress' retention of the directive that BLM land 
be managed under the principles of multiple use and 
sustained yield, suggests that Congress had reviewed 
and endorsed the BLM's land use planning efforts.
-20-
C. Management Framework Plans upheld NRDC v. 
Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985)(appeal 
pending 9th Cir.)
D. Resource Management Plans (RMP) —
1. Planning Regulations, 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601 - 
1610.8 (1986) for RMPs.
a. defined as a land use plan described in 
FLPMA establishing areas for exclusive use, 
allowable resource uses, goals and objectives, 
program constraints and needed management 
practices, any need for more specific plans, 
steps to support action's implementation, and 
monitoring. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.5 (k)(1986).
b. Public participation. 43 CFR 1610.2 (1986)
c. Coordination with state and local 
government. 43 CFR 1610.3-1 (1986).
2. Number pf RMPs that are final or have been 
issued for comment. 52 Fed. Reg. 11129 (1987).
-21-
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITIGATION.
A. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford (Civ. No. 
85-2338 filed July 15, 1985 in United States
District Court for the District of Columbia)
Issues Raised
1. Whether the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA) requires that the withdrawal review 
and revocation and land classification 
termination occur as part of or after
completion of most FLPMA land use plans?
2. Whether all BLM withdrawal revocations should
be set aside for failure to promulgate 
regulations in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 and § 310 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1740?





BLM withdrawal revocations and 
terminations should be set aside 
BLM's failure to prepare a 
environmental impact statement 
102(2)(C) of the National
22-
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)?
Whether all BLM withdrawal revocations should
be set aside for failure to report them to




the NWF asks the
for relief in the amended 
district court
complaint,
a. to declare that the federal defendants' land 
withdrawal review program violates applicable 
laws and regulations,
b. enjoin any action inconsistent with the 
withdrawals, classifications, or other 
designations that are the subject of the lawsuit,
c. order the federal defendants to reinstate all 
land classifications and withdrawals that were in 
existence on January 1, 1981, and
d. order the rescission of all directives, 
instruction memoranda, manuals, or other 
documents regarding the land withdrawal and 
classification review program.
Amended Complaint at 16-17.
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B. Before the preliminary injunction issued, on 
February 10, 1986, the Interior Department estimated 
that it had revoked withdrawals for 2 2 million acres 
of public land and terminated land classifications 
for 160 million acres of land involving 1091 
separate agency actions.
1. The overwhelming majority of the land was not 
closed to mining or mineral leasing.
a, 17 million acres were closed both to mining 
and mineral leasing 5.7 million of which 
were in Alaska;
b, 34 million acres remained in a protective 
classification and closed to entry;
c, 29.8 million acres remained in a protective 
classification open to ' mineral leasing but 
closed to mining;
d, 5.1 million acres open to all forms of
mineral development except non-
metalliferous mining;
-24-
e. 130 million acres open to mining and mineral 
leasing.
2. Case involves 7,000 mining claims and 1,000 mineral 
leases. All land exchanges have been on hold, except 
those released by Congress in December, 1986. Also 
at issue are agriculture land entries and state land 
selections.
C. Under previous agreement with the respective Congressional 
committees another 53 million acres of land are being 
reviewed under S 204 (1). These withdrawls were either 
closed to mining or mineral leasing.
D. Rights of Absent Third Parties.
1. If land was never available for entry under Mining 
Laws or for leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act, 
those intervening rights may be held void ab initio. 
United States ex rel. Hardin v. Fall, 276 F.622 
(D.C.Cir. 1921).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) requires joinder of all 
indispensable parties or the dismissal of the suit, 
if it is not possible to modify the relief
-25-
requested to protect the rights of absent third 
parties not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court.
3. "Public rights" doctrine in National Licorice 
Co. v N L R B , 309 U.S. 3 50 (1940) preceded 1964 
amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) but creates 
an equitable exception to the doctrine of 
joinder. See also NRDC v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 340 F. Supp 400 (D.D.C. 1971) rev1 d
on other grounds, 459 F. 2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972), 
NRDC v. Berkland, 458 F. Supp 925 (D.D.C. 1978)
aff'd, 609 F .2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
E. Scope of judicial relief for procedural violations.
1. Violations of National Environmental Policy Act 
do not support undoing government action already 
taken. Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553
F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977); Park County Resource 
Council v.- Department of Agriculture, No. 
85-2000 (10th Cir. April 17, 1987).
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2. Actions taken without required rulemaking under 
the Administrative Procedure Act can be set 
aside as void. State of South Carolina v. 
Block, 558 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1983).
F. Status of case before District Court and Court of 
Appeals.
CONCLUSION
